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Reevaluating the Nursing Home
Ombudsman's Role with a View
Toward Expanding the Concept of
Dispute Resolution
Jeffrey S. Kahana 1

The creation of ombudsman programs in diverse organizational contexts has
paralleled growing interest in alternative dispute resolution ("ADR"). This
reawakening of interest in a prototype of dispute resolution which was first used
in European countries in the nineteenth century provides a useful case study into
the parameters, promise and limits of formal alternative dispute resolution
programs. This Article will focus on the conceptualization and implementation of
ombudsman programs in long-term care facilities serving the elderly. By tracing
the evolution and scope of such programs, it is hoped that a better understanding
of ADR's limitations and benefits will emerge.
The multi-faceted and sometimes controversial role of the ombudsman has
attracted attention in both the legal and non-legal communities. 2 Researchers have
come to recognize that there is no single definition that accurately captures the
role and duties of the ombudsman. The difficulty of relying on any one definition
becomes apparent when we consider the varied functions of ombudsmen operating
in different contexts. In setting out to explore the concept of the ombudsman, it
is nevertheless useful to consider some general unifying characteristics.
At the most general level, an ombudsman is a third party who intervenes in
addressing concerns of individuals or dependent groups in relation to powerful
organizations or bureaucracies. She may do so either as an impartal mediator or
as a committed advocate. Her power rests in investigating wrongdoing and
making her findings known to the public and/or the relevant governmental
agencies. Through these efforts she may "encourage practices that are fair, just

1. The author holds a BA. and MA. from Case Western Reserve University and a J.D. from
Ohio State University College of Law. He is currently a graduate student in the history of American
civilization at Brandeis University. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments and
suggestions received from Professor Craig McEwan on an earlier draft of this paper and the excellent
research assistance provided by Nancy Schuster of the Case Western Reserve University Sociology
Department. The essay is dedicated to my grandmother, Mrs. Sari Frost, a courageous nursing home
resident.
2. See Kenneth C. Davis, Ombudsman in America: Officers to Criticize Administrative Action,
109 U. PA. L. REv. 1057 (1961); DONALD C. ROWAT, THE OMBUDSMAN: CnzEN's DEFENDER
(1965); WALTER GELLHORN, OMBuDsMEN AND OTHERS: CITIZENS' PROTECTORS INNINE COUNTRIES
(1966); Paul R. Verkuil, The Ombudsman and the Limits of the Adversary System, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
845, 851 (1975).
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and respectful."3

At the same time, there are limits to her authority.

The

ombudsman cannot make, set or change laws. Nor does she have independent
authority to enforce particular recommendations. In this sense, the role of the
ombudsman is auxiliary to that of the legal system. To what extent the
ombudsman concept realizes its potential and is effective in achieving intended
goals remains open to debate.5
The aim of this Article is to examine the function of the ombudsman in the
context of long-term health care facilities.6 The first part of the Article will
consider the broader history and purposes of the office of the ombudsman. The
second part will focus on the traditional methods used to ensure quality of care in
the nursing home. The third part will examine the specific role played by the
ombudsman in the ecological context of the nursing home. Finally, the fourth part
will consider the effectiveness of the nursing home ombudsman as an alternative
form of dispute resolution. In view of the often powerless position of nursing
home residents, many of whom are ill and suffer from assorted disabilities, there
is an urgent need for discussion that will lead to a better understanding of the role
of the nursing home ombudsman and their relationship to the larger ombudsman
phenomenon.7
I. THE HISTORY OF THE OMBUDSMAN
The role of the ombudsman was first introduced in the Scandinavian
countries during the early nineteenth century and gained momentum by the middle
of the twentieth century. The "classical" concept, based on the early Scandinavian
experience, maintained that the ombudsman was an independent defender of the
citizenry against the competing interests of government. Thus, the main function
of the classical ombudsman, even as seen today, has been to serve as a bridge
between the citizen and the state
Professor Walter Gellhorn, whose writings from the 1960's still stand as the
authoritative works on the subject, has described the ombudsman as a "high level,
independent, legally constituted, greatly respected officer" who will "look into

3. Mary P. Rowe, The Ombudsman's Role in a Dispute Resolution System, NEGOTIATION
JOURNAL 354 (October 1991).
4. Id.at 353-54.
5. Verkuil, supra note 2, at 846.
6. Most recently questions have been raised over the propriety of the New Jersey state long-term
care ombudsman's request to be notified about all residents seeking to withhold or withdraw life
sustaining treatment even in cases where the resident is competent See Kathleen Bird, Ombudsman
in Center of a New Storim, His Comments on Nursing-Home Care Disturb Medical, Legal Experts,
123(5) NEw JERSEY L.J. 1 (Feb. 2, 1989); David M. Price & Paul W. Armstrong, New Jersey's
"Granny Doe" Squad: Arguments about Mechanisms for Protection of Vulnerable Patients, 17(3)
LAw, MEDICINE AND HEALTH CARE 255 (1989).
7. See INsTITUrE OF MEDICINE, IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF CARE INNuRsNG HOMEs (1986).
8. See Stephen Owen, The Expanding Role of the Ombudsman in the Administrative State, 40(3)
U. TORONTO L. J. 670, 676-86 (1990); C.C. Milton, The Ombudsman as a Protector of Fundamental
Personal Rights, 7 THE OMBUDSMAN JOURNAL 89 (1988).
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citizens' dissatisfactions with government."9 Gellhorn conducted research on
ombudsman's offices in nine countries.'
He concluded that the classical
ombudsman could be characterized by his training, selection, and authority.
Holders of this office shared similar experiences, were selected by the legislature
and were often trained in the law."-' They were expected to be free and
independent from political considerations 2 and responsible for responding to
complaints, as well as initiating their own informal inquiries into government
conduct."
In addressing specific grievances, the classical ombudsman seeks to arrive at
both substantive and procedural safeguards which will reduce the likelihood of
similar grievances arising in the future. Accordingly, Gelihorn observed that the
"primary purpose of the external critic (ombudsman) is to build for the future

rather than to exhume the past. Constructive suggestions about the avoidance of
similar controversies may not be precluded
by inability to reach a firm conclusion
'4
about guilt in the present instance."'
Following this approach, the classical ombudsman was concerned with
developing ways to reduce the occurrence of conflicts in the future, as opposed to

admonishing or penalizing the wrongdoing party." An example of this approach
is illustrated in the following case.' 6 A police officer, in possession of a warrant,

entered a school classroom to arrest a boy charged with committing a crime. The
parents of the boy (who had subsequently been cleared) sued the police for what
they claimed was an unnecessarily embarrassing incident. Upon hearing this case,
the court summarily dismissed the complaint and held that the police officer had
acted legally since he had an arrest warrant. This decision was the end of the
inquiry as far as the judges were concerned.
This is the type of case which, according to Gellhorn, would have benefitted
from the presence of an ombudsman. The classical ombudsman would have been
less concerned with the particular police officer and whether or not they had acted
legally. Instead, he would have probably approached the chief of police and
suggested that in the future arrests should be made outside of the classroom.

9. WALTER GELLHORN, THE OMBUDSMAN
OMBUDSMAN 10 (1970).
10. GELLHORN, supra note 2.

11.

CONCEPT IN THE UNITED STATES, OUR KIND OF

Id at 422-23.

12. "The officers chiefly discussed in these pages are expected to be bravely independent,
untroubled by political pressures or personal insecurities." Id at 425. Whether this is an accurate
portrayal seems to be debatable in light of the fact that the ombudsmen were chosen through the
legislature, a political body.
13. Id at 429-32. These functions are performed in conjunction with the ombudsman's general
powers of inspection and supervision. It should be recognized that the inquiries are not formal
adversarial encounters. Rather, they are based on informal conversations with public officials and
complainants. Perhaps, the most important process of inquiry is the ombudsman's privilege to review
official papers and records.
14. Id at 432-33.
15. Verkuil, supra note 2, at 846.
16. GELLHORN, supra note 9, at 16.
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Here, the ombudsman recognizes that the law dictates the underlying policy of
when an arrest is lawful. Rather, the ombudsman is concerned with finding the
most satisfactory method for carrying out or implementing the law or legislative
policy.
This example is an important illustration of the way in which the classical
ombudsman was perceived to have operated. His role was principally to uncover
instances where the implementation of governmental policy or laws was causing
unnecessary friction with the public. Once uncovered, suggestions could be made
regarding satisfactory methods for eliminating this friction. In this way, "the
7
particular instance would have a generative force beyond the episode itself."'
Another important attribute of the classical ombudsman was his perceived and
actual impartiality. Gellhorn emphasized the importance of impartiality when he
wrote:
Wherever the ombudsman has functioned, he has been purely and
plainly an advocate of sound administration, not an advocate of the
position of the complainant. In this respect he has differed from many
legislators who tend, when a constituent complains, to become an
advocate of the complainant's case without much consideration of its
merit .... The ombudsman, on the other hand. . . is simply stationed
at the margin, as it were, between the citizen and the official, and he
must be concerned with seeing that justice is done to public servants as
well as to the public whom they serve.'
The significance of the ombudsman as an impartial actor attested to the belief
that the ombudsman could improve public administration only where both parties
perceived him to be acting fairly and not advocating either side's position. An
impartial and non-adversarial orientation was viewed as a necessary condition to
facilitating communication and promoting effective solutions to avoid similar
disputes in the future. 9
These considerations have led observers to distinguish between the
ombudsman and more traditional dispute resolution mechanisms. Noting these
differences, Verkuil commented that "the ombudsman and adversary systems are
substantially competing procedures for the regularization of informal processes;
each is based on a different conception of the dispute resolution process and
reflects different underlying social and political values."20

17.
18.

Id.
Id. at 13.

19. This view of the ombudsman as an impartial umpire and mediator is still widely held today.
The lack of directive power on the part of the ombudsman has been considered an advantage in terms
of maintaining at least the appearance of a separation between the ombudsman and the state
bureaucracy. See Milton, supra note 8, at 91.
20. Verkuil, supra note 2, at 846.
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The classical ombudsman's primary function was to facilitate communication
between citizens and the government in order to promote more effective public
administration. For traditionalists, the challenge posed to "good order," which the
ombudsman was supposed to address, was not that government policy itself was
flawed or insensitive to the needs of constituents. Rather, it was that in the
process of implementing policies, governmental agents (broadly conceived as
anyone who exercises governmental power) would act improperly, thereby causing
unnecessary conflicts. 2' The ombudsman's function was to deal with citizens'
grievances and complaints about government. In this way the ombudsman was
both an aid and alternative to existing formal mechanisms of governmental review.
Based on the early Scandinavian experience with ombudsman programs,
Rowat identified the following three distinct and potentially divergent attributes:
1.

The ombudsman is an independent and non-partisan officer of the
legislature, usually provided for in the constitution, who supervises its
administration;

2.

The ombudsman deals with specific complaints from the public against
administrative injustice and maladministration; and

3.

The ombudsman has the power to investigate, criticize, and publicize,
but not to reverse administrative action.22

These definitions reflect a recognition of the elasticity of the ombudsman concept
but one that is bound to certain traditional principles. They legitimate functions
of variable impartial interventions, but do not specifically point toward partisan
advocacy.
Such a view of the classical ombudsman is largely based on a Scandinavian
prototype. It is consistent with the ideal represented in Denmark of an
ombudsman with national stature and prestige who has access to public officials
at all levels.23 The rights-oriented American polity has not been receptive to this
type of national ombudsman. 24 The ombudsman in America has typically not
represented a national constituency. Her functions have also been less clearly
defined and have varied depending upon the institution and parties she serves.

21. GELLHORN, supra note 2, at 1-2. Whether this is the real challenge to "good order" is
debatable. Yet, this can clearly be a source of additional conflict that government needs assistance in
detecting and resolving.
22. ROWAT, supra note 2, at XXIV.
23.

GELLHORN, supra note 2, at 5-7. Professor Stephen Hurwitz who served as Denmark's first

ombudsman entered the office as an already prominent citizen who could use his considerable
reputation to promote and implement the concept of the ombudsman. Id.
24. The tendency in the United States has been for citizens to rely chiefly on legal remedies and
not on internal dispute resolution processes such as the ombudsman. See John W. Wade, Tort Law as
Ombudsman, 65 OR. L. REv. 309, 310, 322-25 (1986).
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In contrast to the Scandinavian ombudsman, whose focus is primarily
centered on designing ways in which future conflicts can be avoided, the American
ombudsman has assumed a more active role in attempting to mediate and negotiate
settlements. Here, the duality of the ombudsman's role as impartial umpire and
partisan advocate is increasingly reflected. One reason for the divergence in the
roles played by different ombudsmen can be explained by reference to the level
of conflict between the disputants. It has been argued that "the classical
ombudsman functions optimally in a consensus-oriented society. 25 It would
follow, therefore, that as the degree of conflict between parties increases or as the
political culture diverges from a consensus orientation, there is a greater need to
develop alternatives to the classical ombudsman. This has been the American
experience as ombudsmen have assumed greater responsibility in varying
institutions.
As discussed above, the classical ombudsman was primarily viewed as a
counterweight to the large and impersonal offices of bureaucratic governments.
Interestingly, today ombudsmen occupy important roles in both public and private
institutions such as businesses, universities, and hospitals.26 Thus, an important
challenge to understanding the utility of ombudsman programs is to explore them
in their specific contexts. To the extent that alternative models apply and work
in different settings, the multi-dimensional aspects of this form of dispute
resolution may be understood.
The concept of the ombudsman both in its classical construction and its more
modern implementation constitutes a non-traditional orientation to dispute
resolution. Prior to considering the question of the effectiveness of this approach,
it is useful to consider the rationale for its existence and practice.
Why an ombudsman? Gellhorn considers the ombudsman to be an addition
to and not a replacement of existing channels for addressing individual and
collective grievances." He considers the ombudsman's appeal to be based both
on its absolute and relative cost effectiveness.28 The existence of such an office
is also seen as having an overriding symbolic benefit. It inspires confidence in the
legitimacy and "good order" of the institutions it serves.29 More recent
developments, especially the growing alternative dispute resolution field, lend
additional credence to the ombudsman concept. An ombudsman program can
address grievances through informal and flexible processes that might be

25. ABRAHAM MONK, Er. AL., RESOLVING GRIEVANCES INTHE NURsING HOME 16 (1984).
26. Id. at 19-34.
27. It is interesting to note that Professor Gellhom while concerned with what has been termed
the "classical ombudsman" anticipated the current debate over how and whether formal and informal
mechanisms should be used to resolve disputes. He observed, "[h]eavy machinery need not be used
on the great bulk of citizens' discontents and uncertainties about official actions. The main batteries
of governmental power can be held in reserve, to be used sparingly when lighter machinery has failed."
See GELLHORN, supra note 2, at 4.
Id. at 1-4.
28.
29. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1994/iss2/2

6

Kahana: Kahana: Reevaluating the Nursing Home Ombudsman's Role

1994]

The.Nursing Hone Ombudsman

considered less threatening to the parties involved."

Ombudsmen can also

identify and focus on "interests" as opposed to "rights" as a way of encouraging
the resolution of disputes." Finally, ombudsmen are often better equipped than
courts for dealing with conflicts where there are no principled rules for deciding
which outcome is best.32 These considerations should be recognized as "relevant"
to the utility of an ombudsman program. They do not, however, lead to the
conclusion that the ombudsman concept is appropriate for all contexts and
occasions."
The ombudsman has become a ubiquitous phenomenon in American society.
We currently have prison ombudsmen, academic ombudsmen, medical
ombudsmen, social welfare ombudsmen, and consumer ombudsmen. What these
settings have in common is a citizen in a vulnerable or dependent position
surrounded by a powerful bureaucracy. While the citizen is not necessarily
confronted with the broad panoply of governmental machinery, he still may be
overwhelmed by a system he has little control over. The term "hybrid
ombudsman" has been used to describe the role of the ombudsman on this more
micro-level.34 She is part mediator, part watchdog, and part advocate. The

ombudsman may actually be hired by the organization in which she functions or
she may be appointed by governmental agencies. It may be readily seen that
diverse constituencies influence the definition and implementation of the

ombudsman concept in these settings.
In like manner, the presence of an ombudsman program gives rise to
numerous dualities. Let us consider the example of the nursing home. The
administration may view the ombudsman as a quick and cost effective instrument
for eliminating consumer grievances. The complainant may seek an advocate who
provides him with increased. access to justice. Government agencies or citizens'
groups may see the role of the ombudsman primarily in a regulatory, reformist or

30. Formal systems generally refer to a "highly structured process in which the steps (for
resolving the dispute) are defied in detail." Informal systems refer to an "intentionally open-ended
process." Ingrid Clarke, Grievance HandlingMechanismafor Universities,DISPUTE RESOLUTION: AN
OPEN FORUM, 33 (1986).
31.
WII.UAM L. URY, Er. AL., GETrTING DISPUTES RESOLVED 5-19 (1988).

These authors

propose that "interests" are an important element to any analysis of disputes. To the extent that more
formal systems tend to focus on power and rights to the exclusion of interests an important dimension
underlying the dispute is overlooked.
32. See Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353 (1978).
Fuller argues that "polycentric" problems (multiple solutions and no principled way to choose among
them) demonstrate the limits of adjudication. Fuller's concerns may be especially relevant to grievances
brought to the attention of the ombudsman. Cf.J.W.F. Allison, Fuller's Analysis of Polycentric
Disputes and the Limits of Adjudication, 53 CAMBRIDGE LJ. 367 (1994).
33. It has been argued that disputes involving important personal rights should not be dealt with
through alternative dispute resolution processes. See generally, Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93
YALE LJ. 1073 (1984); Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?,
99 HAgv. L. REV. 668 (1986). An alternative argument is that ombudsman programs and other ADR
systems can in many (although not all) instances be used effectively in conjunction with the concept
of a "multi-door courthouse." See STIEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, ET.AL., DIsPUrE RESOLUTON 514 (1985).
34. MONK ET AL., supra note 25, at 19.
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advocacy context. The general public might view the ombudsman as representing
the interest of the community and that the nursing home ensure a threshold level
of fairness. The ombudsman may see herself in a more comprehensive role, both
mediating disputes and advocating for procedural changes to safeguard the rights
of citizens. She may do so both within the organizational structure or by
advocating for reform or oversight by government agencies regulating the industry
or organization. Focusing on the implementation of the ombudsman's role in the
context of the nursing home will permit us to explore how these alternative
definitions take shape.
II. THE REGULATION OF THE LONG-TERM CARE FACILITY
The concern that nursing home residents do not receive high quality care has
been recognized by both federal and state review committees." Generally, there
are two methods through which quality of care issues in the nursing home are
addressed: (1) private causes of action brought by or on the behalf of residents;
and (2) government regulation.36
Resort to private lawsuits has not been an effective method for protecting
most frail nursing home residents." The reasons for this are based on the nature
of tort law and the general frailty of most nursing home residents.3" Most
nursing home residents do not have alternative support systems and are highly
dependent on the nursing home. Even those who are mentally alert are
understandably reluctant to sue the home, therein fearing possible retribution.
Assuming that the resident were able and willing to sue they would have to
overcome the following obstacles:
1.

The prinafacie case,.particularly requirements that the plaintiff prove
causation and actual damages;

35. GEN. ACCT. OFF., MEDICARE AND MEDICAID: STRONGER ENFORCEMENT OF NURSING HOME
REQUIEMENTs NEEDED (1987); see also INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 7.
36. See Patricia Butler, NursingHome Qualityof CareEnforcement, PartI- Litigationby Private
Parties and PartII- State Agency Enforcement Remedies, 14(7) CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEw 622, 665

(1980). In 1990, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 became effective revising the federal
standards nursing homes are required to meet if they are to remain eligible for reimbursement under
Medicaid and Medicare. See Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330 (1987). See also Toby S. Edelman,
The Nursing Home Reform Law: Issues for Litigation, 24(6) CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEw 545 (1990);
Toby S. Edelman, The Nursing Home Reform Law: The FederalResponse, 27(5) CLEARINGHOUSE
REvIEw 454 (1993).
37. SONDRA H. JOHNSON, E'. AL., NURSING HOMES AND THE LAw; STATE REGULATION AND
PRIVATE LITIGATION (1985); S. Johnson, The Regulation of Long-term Care:A Decade of Experience
with Intermediate Sanctions, 13(4) LAw, MEDICINE AND HEALTH CARE 160, 179 (1985); c.f John J.
Regan, When Nursing Home PatientsComplain: The Ombudsman or the Patient Advocate, 65 GEO.

U. 691 (1977).
38.

See Joel F. Handler, Community Carefor the FrailElderly: A Theory of Empowerment, 50

OHIO ST. L.J. 541 (1989) (criticizing the legal rights approach when used in connection with the frail
elderly).
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2.

The evidentiary hurdle especially where older residents suffer from
physical disabilities including impaired vision and hearing that would
detract from their credibility; and

3.

Retaining adequate legal representation where punitive damages are not
available. Since shorter lifespans of the elderly and greater disabilities
are likely to lower damages that might be recovered should they prevail,
attorneys will be less likely to accept such cases.39

On the other hand, fear of liability on the part of nursing homes has led to
protective strategies that may in fact be harmful to the residents. This has
generally been the case with those nursing homes that employ physical and
chemical restraints to ensure that residents do not injure themselves.40 These
factors have meant that for the most part quality of care issues are dealt with by
the states through their power to license nursing homes and via the federal
government which sets standards for participation in the Medicare and Medicaid
reimbursement programs.
A. FederalRegulation
The power of the purse has been the primary vehicle for federal regulation
of nursing homes.4' Those nursing homes that meet the standards set by the
Health Care Financing Administration ("HCFA") may obtain certification and
participate in the Medicare program.42 The guidelines for -determining
certification are contained in HCFA's long-term care certification form.43
Questions relate to compliance with state and local laws, governance and
management of the home, medical direction, physician, nursing, and rehabilitative
services." In the past, the survey instrument has been criticized for using vague
criteria and for placing an inappropriate focus on facility capabilities rather than
resident care.4" The present regulations, reflecting the requirements of the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, have expanded the focus on

residents' rights and quality of life.46 Although the current regulations do pay

39. See S. JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 37, at Chapter 6.
40. Sondra H. Johnson, The Fear ofLiability andthe Use of Restraints in Nursing Homes, 18(3)
LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 263, 270 (1990).
See Janice M. Caldwell & Marshall B. Kapp, The Rights of Nursing Home Patients:
41.
Possibilitiesand Limitations of FederalRegulation, 6 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 41-42 (1981); Vija
Kemanis, Note, A CriticalEvaluation of the FederalRole in Nursing Home Quality Enforcement, 51
U. COLO. L. REV. 607, 615-621 (1990); Timothy S. lost, Enforcement of Quality Nursing Home Care
in the Legal System,13(4) LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 160, 162 (1985).
42.
See 42 C.F.R. § 483 (1993), Kemanis, supra note 41, at 615.
43.
See 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.100, .105 (1993).
44. Id.
45. Kemanis, supra note 41, at 622.
46. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.10, .15, .25 (1993); see also INSTrrUrE OF MEDICInE, supra note 7.
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greater attention to resident well-being and "resident outcomes," the regulations
still rely heavily on structural indicators. With many more nursing homes and a
limited number of inspectors, it is much easier to assess facility structure and
organization than it is to monitor the care provided to residents. This is reflected
as well in the enforcement of the federal regulations. Nursing homes that fail to
meet the federal standards are first subject to extended surveys and opportunities
to develop plans to improve the conditions of the home before more severe
sanctions are sought.
B. State Regulation
The states, through their police powers, establish conditions which nursing
homes must meet to obtain a license for operation and to receive certification for
participation in Medicaid.47 These standards require that nursing homes provide
a reasonable level of care to residents in an environment that is safe and promotes
resident autonomy to the extent possible. A number of states have attempted to
proyide greater structure to regulations and subdivide violations into classes based
on the degree to which the violation directly impacts on the health of the
resident.48
The type of violation and the category within which the violation is
classified is likely to influence the remedy which the state will pursue. In
California, citations vary according to the nature of the violation, the risk of harm
they present to the residents' mental and physical condition, the efforts of the
nursing home to prevent the violation, and the licensee's history of compliance
with regulations.49 Class A violations are the most serious. They present either
an imminent danger or substantial probability that death or serious harm will result
to the resident.
These more serious types of violations are also prime candidates for state
agencies to petition for decertification of the home or the appointment of a
receiver for the nursing home. Where the remedy of a receivership is granted the
provider retains ownership of the facility, but a court-appointed receiver controls
and manages the facility.5" Although the receiver acts within the powers granted
to him by the court, receivership is usually an interim measure adopted where a
nursing home is closing and the residents are likely to be subjected to precipitous
transfer.5 For example, if a state agency determines that a nursing home's
license should be revoked but the hearing has not yet taken place, courts may

47.

See 42 C.F.R. § 442.12(a) (1993).

48. ABA Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly Model Recommendations: Intermediate
Sanctions for Enforcement of Quality Care in Nursing Homes (American Bar Assn., Washington, D.C.

(1981)).
49. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1424(a)(1)-(5) (1994); See also Johnson, supra note
at 186 n.20.
50. See Johnson, supra note .37, at 177.
51. A
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1994/iss2/2
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place the home in a receivership if it is determined that the health of the residents
cannot be guaranteed until the date of the hearing.
Class B or C violations are less severe in nature than class A violations and
represent infractions that do not immediately threaten the health and safety of
residents.5 2 These lesser violations are often dealt with through correction plans
that are negotiated between the nursing home and the state agency and call for a
specific time at which the home will be reinspected. 53 If the home is still unable
to comply, the agency is supposed to issue a notice of noncompliance. The
agency can then issue another date for reinspection, or if the violation is more
serious, can fine the home or suspend the home's admitting privileges.
While revocation of a nursing home's license appears to be a rather stringent
remedy, it should be noted that even in instances of class A violations most
agencies are reluctant to use their authority to revoke the home's license and/or
place it in receivership. There are important considerations behind this approach.
First, revoking a nursing home's license, especially one that provides skilled care,
would force many of the sickest residents to find a new place to live at a time
when there is a shortage of available beds. Secondly, the effect of closing a
nursing home is that many of the employees, such as nurses' aids, kitchen help,
and custodians will have difficulty finding alternative employment because they
have only basic skills which are not readily transferable.
This discussion indicates that state agencies are frequently overburdened and
prefer to work with the nursing home as opposed to seeking judicial intervention.
A central objective of agency regulation appears to be reaching an agreement with
the nursing home without resorting to formal disciplinary measures. Even where
remedial action is taken, state agencies have been reluctant to resort to delicensure
or decertification. 4 They have, instead, relied on intermediate sanctions,
including: civil fines, suspension of admissions, and, to a lesser degree,
receiverships." While this current approach to nursing home regulation may
provide a less costly and more politically desirable alternative to litigation, it raises
questions about whether nursing home residents are really receiving a second class
version of justice. Considering these factors suggests that the nursing home
residents' interests are not completely protected by the traditional methods of
government regulation and that alternative strategies should be further studied.

52.
53.
54.
55.

See CAL. HEALTH & SAFErY CODE § 1424 (1994).
See Jost, supra note 41, at 164-65.
Id. at 162.

Id
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THE LoNG-TERM CARE OMBUDSMAN

The requirement that state agencies on aging establish ombudsman offices is
set out in the Older American's Act.56 According to the Act, the duties of the
long-term care ombudsman are primarily to "investigate and resolve complaints
made by or on behalf of older individuals who are residents of long-term care
facilities."5" The statute specifies that the investigation will be initiated where
the "action, inaction or decisions of providers . . . of long-term care services,
public agencies or social service agencies.. . may adversely affect the rights" of
the resident.5 8
It is important to look beyond the words of this statute and to ask whether
on the whole the long-term care ombudsman actually improves the quality of care
and life for the elderly resident of the nursing home. Recent research on this
question has pointed to three different modalities in which ombudsmen function,
or are perceived as functioning, within the nursing home. 9
First, the ombudsman may function in a theraputic or developmental role.
The ombudsman who falls into this category is seen as providing support to
individual residents, thereby facilitating their adjustment in the nursing home.
This ombudsman may also be viewed as playing a preventive role by reducing the
likelihood that conflicts will arise and that legal action will ensue.
Second, the ombudsman may function as a mediator. The ombudsman who
serves as mediator insures that some form of justice is made available to persons
who would not ordinarily have access to the legal system.6' He also facilitates
a method of dispute resolution that is cost effective, efficient, and ultimately
affords individually tailored solutions that can be matched to the particular needs
of the nursing home resident.
Finally, the ombudsman may function as as advocate. The ombudsman who
acts as an advocate for the residents' interests can be expected to assume a more

56.

42 U.S.C. § 3027(12) (1992); see also INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, REAL PEOPLE, REAL

PROBLEMS: AN EVALUATION OF THE LONG-TERM CARE OMBUDSMEN PROGRAMS OF THE OLDER

AMERICANS ACT (1995).

57. Id § 12(a)(i).
58. Id. Under the mandate of the Act, states must also make adequate legal counsel "available"
to their ombudsman program. 42 U.S.C. § 3058(g) (1994 Cum. Supp.). Studies, however, indicate
that "most ombudsman programs are dissatisfied in some degree with the quality of their legal support"
See Lori Owen & Michael R. Schuster, Legal Support to Long-Term Care Ombadsnan Programs:
Seven Years Later, 28(6) CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEw 617, 624 (1994).
59. Abraham Monk & Lenard W. Kaye, The Ombudsman Volunteer in the Nursing Home:
Differential Role Perceptions of Patient Representatives for the Institutionalized Aged, 22 THE
GERONTOLOGIST 194 (1989); Howard Litwin, Lenard W. Kaye & Abraham Monk, Conflicting
Orientations to Patient Advocacy in Long-Term Care, 24 THE GERONTOLOGIST 275 (1984).

60.
61.

Litwin, et al., supra note 59, at 278.
Monk & Kaye, supra note 59, at 194.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1994/iss2/2

12

1994]

Kahana: Kahana: Reevaluating the Nursing Home Ombudsman's Role
The Nursing Home Ombudsman

partisan and adversarial role vis-A-vis the nursing home.62 The ombudsman
advocate can use her information gathering powers on behalf of the residents to
pave the way for political and/or legal action.
It should be recognized that these categories stand out as rough parameters
that demarcate the different functions of the nursing home ombudsman. They can
also be viewed as sequential roles that the nursing home ombudsman may assume
as the circumstances require. In this way, the ombudsman is particularly well
suited to handle a wide range of disputes and has broad latitude in the dispute
processing options that she may pursue. Thus, conflicts in the nursing home can
be responded to in many different ways based on (1) the type of dispute; (2) the
individuals or groups involved; (3) the mandate of the ombudsman program; and
(4) the orientation of the particular ombudsman.
The special need for flexibility among ombudsmen is illustrated by the fact
that disputes range from incidents of resident abuse to conflicts involving decisions
by residents to act in ways that are not in their best interests. For example, a
diabetic resident may demand to be served sweets. Similarly, the ombudsman
may often be called on to respond to conflicts between co-residents. Given the
polycentric nature of many of these disputes, the ombudsman represents a complex
but particularly adaptive response. It is not, however, without limitations. In
particular, the availability of an ombudsman may lead to a greater number of
complaints being filed since there is no economic disincentive similar to that
which operates with the use of the legal system. Additionally, the ombudsman can
be viewed as a weak advocate since she has limited personal prestige and lacks the
power to sanction the nursing home. When viewed in context, however, these
limitations seem especially relevant to low intensity (minor and trivial disputes)
and high intensity (serious and important disputes) conflicts. For the majority of
problems, the ombudsman has the capacity to respond and her effectiveness is
greatest in the very same areas where the classical ombudsman functioned best,
such as remedying marginal defects.
In this Article, we have thus far considered whether the ombudsman has the
capacity to respond to resident problems. Assuming that this capacity exists, at
least at a general level, we must now ask whether the ombudsman is an effective
response when compared to the alternatives.
IV. EFFECrVENESS OF THE OMBUDSMAN
The effectiveness of nursing home ombudsman programs has been debated.
Program effectiveness is often difficult to ascertain because of the conflicting
perspectives of diverse constituencies. Goals and role definitions differ among
administrators and staff of the nursing home, nursing home residents, community
stakeholders, regulatory agencies, and the ombudsman involved. Criteria of

62. MONK, ET AL., supra note 25, at 30. The advocacy role is compared to that of a lawyer who
is characterized as "partisan in a social conflict, and his expertise is available exclusively to serve client

interests." Id.
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program success can be measured against the therapeutic, mediator, and advocacy
functions described above. In addition, broader criteria of success may be applied
in terms of the overall efficacy of the ombudsman as a dispute processing option.
Such an analysis would consider transaction costs, party satisfaction with outcomes
and procedures, the effect on the relationship of the disputant parties, and the
recurrence of the same or similar disputes.63
Two empirical approaches to assessing effectiveness have been documented
in the literature. The first is based on reports of satisfaction with resolving
grievances from perspectives of nursing home residents, staff, and the
ombudsman." A second approach considered the role of ombudsman program
implementation in nursing homes in relation to quality of care.65
Monk and Kaye conducted a survey to assess perceived effectiveness of
ombudsman programs in urban nursing homes." Responses were compared for
residents, staff, and ombudsmen. Among patients who used the services of an
ombudsman to address their grievances, there was a divided view regarding the
success of the ombudsman in resolving disputes. Among residents polled, fortythree percent reported satisfactory resolution, thirty-nine percent reported lack of
resolution and eighteen percent were unsure. As a whole, residents were satisfied
with the respectfulness, sensitivity and interest of the ombudsman, notwithstanding
their moderate success in the outcomes achieved. This seems to suggest that
ombudsmen were most effective in their supportive or therapeutic roles which
were highly valued by residents.
Another study, conducted by Cherry focused on quality of care indicators in
nursing homes served by ombudsmen and those without similar programs.67 In
a state wide survey of nursing homes in Missouri, Cherry demonstrated that
quality of care is generally better in facilities with active ombudsman programs.
He attributed this improved quality of care to the ombudsman's capacity to bring
a community presence to the nursing home rather than to specific mediating or
advocacy functions. He also suggests that the effectiveness of ombudsman
programs on the local level may be best served by collaborative approaches.
Whereas on the state level, a more aggressive and adversarial approach may be
most effective. This distinction may fit with the prevalent use of volunteer
ombudsmen at the local and professional ombudsmen at the state level.
Consideration of the following studies indicates that ombudsmen are generally
highly regarded by the parties who are themselves involved in disputes. This
criterion of "perceived satisfaction with the fairness of a dispute resolution
procedure" has been termed procedural justice.6 It is interesting that there is a

URY, ET AL., supra note 31, at 11-12.
63.
64. Abraham Monk & Lenard W. Kaye, Assessing the Efficacy of Ombudsman Services for the
Aged in Long Term Care Institutions, 5 EVALUATON AND PROGRAM PLANNING 363 (1982).
65. Cherry, Agents of Nursing Home Quality of Care: Ombudsmen and Staff Ratios Revisited,
31 THE GERONTOLOGIST 302 (1991).
66. Monk & Kaye, supra note 59, at 363.
67. Cherry, supra note 65, at 302,
68. URY, ET AL., supra note 31, at 179 n.l l.
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marked difference between the disputants' satisfaction with the process, as opposed
to the outcome ("distributive justice") notwithstanding the literature which suggests
a high correlation between the two.69 Perhaps one reason for this is that

disputants tend to measure success not against a buffered version of their interests
but against an absolute conception of their rights. In the nursing home,
satisfaction with fairness of process does not necessarily translate into satisfaction
with the end result.

The questions of whether the ombudsman is able to significantly reduce
transaction costs and the recurrence of disputes remains to be addressed in the

literature.

The costs of disputing are generally considered to be primarily

economic. In the context of the nursing home, there might also be significant
human costs especially in cases where the physical well-being of the resident is
concerned. It would appear that the ombudsman is a transactionally cost efficient
alternative in cases of low to middle intensity disputes while less effective in high
intensity disputes. One reason for this difference is the likely correlation between
party willingness to make decisions based on their "interests" in low to middle
intensity disputes. In contrast, it can be expected that parties will make decisions
based on their "rights" in high intensity types of disputes."0
Similarly, the ombudsman may be most effective in avoiding the recurrence
of disputes where she identifies procedural as opposed to substantive conflicts.
Where these procedures result in low intensity conflicts, they may be more readily
amenable to change based on notice and recommendations of the ombudsman.
Another important criterion for the success of a dispute resolution relates to
the ability of the parties to the conflict to maintain a continuing relationship. This
is of special concern to residents in nursing homes who typically lack the option
of relocating to another residential facility. In fact, fear that they may be asked
to leave or that their funding may be disrupted is likely a factor that prevents
institutionalized aged from expressing dissatisfaction. Non-adversarialintervention
of the ombudsman is useful because of her ability to give voice to resident
grievances in a way that allows the administration to save face and does not result
in dismissal of the resident. It remains to be seen to what extent adversarial
interventions would undermine the continuance of such relationships.
Different approaches to evaluating program effectiveness converge in pointing
to the unique contributions of the nursing home ombudsman as a citizen advocate
who by her very presence may accomplish far more than through the success of
her mediating efforts. Our focus on the ecological context of the nursing home
permits us to recognize that for the frail resident, living in a setting which cuts
him off from the outside world, the humanizing influences of a community
presence provided by the ombudsman may be the most salient contribution.
In order to understand the implementation of ombudsman programs in
specific localities, we must acknowledge the decentralized manner in which these
programs are funded and operationalized. Although ombudsman programs are

69.

Id at 180.

70.

Id. at 7.
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nationally mandated, the funding and staffing of ombudsmen's offices are
regulated by the states as are the duties and powers delegated to the individual
offices.
Specific state legislation outlines the duties and responsibilities of the state
long-term care ombudsman. In most states, the key duties of the ombudsman are
to investigate complaints by residents, establish a statewide uniform reporting
service and establish public forums for the discussion of issues relating to the
health and safety of residents.7' The primary power of the ombudsman is
investigative, and most states allow them considerable access to nursing home
residents and their records.72 Many states also authorize the ombudsman to refer
complaints to the agencies responsible for nursing home licensing and to publicize
their findings. 73 These powers illustrate that although the ombudsman is not an
advocate in the traditional legal sense, she can serve a crucial function in
safeguarding the interests of residents by blending her therapeutic, mediating and
advocacy skills.
V. CONCLUSION
It is hoped that the foregoing discussion illustrates the many opportunities and
challenges of ADR programs when used to address situations in which the law is
intimately interwoven with questions of social policy. This Article has considered
the historical development of the ombudsman program from its classical origins
to the more recent hybrid versions. In the process, it has revealed a progression
from a broad government-based focus to one that is narrower and tied to specific
organizations. This narrowing focus was well adapted to dealing with conflicts
encountered by citizens in their interactions with increasingly complex and diverse
organizations.
This Article next turned to the ecological context of the nursing home and
both the situational factors that shaped disputes as well as the ombudsman's
options for encouraging their resolution. For the elderly residing in nursing
homes, the therapeutic functions, on the one-hand, and advocacy functions, on the
other, emerged as significant adjuncts to the traditional mediating roles of the
ombudsman. These different functions may embody conflicting requirements for

9, § 6660.2; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 19A,
71. See, e.g., N.Y. Comp.CODES R. &REGS. tit.
33 (1981); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 173.17 (1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 400.0065 (1993); CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 9720, 9721 (1984). A recent study reviewing the complaint reporting system
found significant divergence between the states in how information is collected, analyzed and
responded to by the responsible state agencies. F. Netting, et al., The Long-Term Care Ombudsman
Program: What Does The Complaint Reporting System Tell Us? 32(6) THE GERONTOLOGIST 843-48
(1992).
9, § 6660.12; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 19A, §
72. See N.Y. COWe. CODES R.& REOS. tit.
30 (1981); CAL. WELF. & INST. Code, §§ 9722-9724 (1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 400.0081 (1993);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 173.20. (1990).
73. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODe, §§ 9721, 9726 (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 19A,
§ 33(c); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 400.0075(2); OHIo ADMIN. CODE § 173 (1993).
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collaboration or adversary approaches to dispute resolution. Consideration of the
structural framework set up by the states for discharging these alternatives
functions and also permits a better understanding of the way structure may
facilitate function in ADR.
Finally, this case study of the ombudsman program in its historical,
ecological and structural contexts allows one to make some generalizations about
the ombudsman as an ADR mechanism vis-?-vis the judiciary. Limitations of
ombudsman programs as they currently function include lack of clear funding
mechanisms and an absence of directive power. The ombudsman's broad range
of jurisdiction is offset by a lack of authority which may hinder enforcing
Advantages of the ombudsman system include greater
recommendations.
flexibility, accessibility, cost effectiveness and a better fit with preventive as
opposed to ameliorative orientations to safeguarding interests of the individual.
As such, ombudsman programs may transcend the objective of resolving specific
disputes between individuals and organizations and may represent a foray into the
realm of formulating and implementing social policy. The program goals and
ultimate accomplishments thus both supplement and parallel those of the legal
system.
The nursing home ombudsman program clearly has the potential to

significantly further the "good administration" of our current long-term care policy
and enhance its future development. The question which remains is whether this
potential will be realized as programs mature and as we become an older society.
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